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and, using several concepts, provides "bands" or  things that need to be done:
a "range" for capital flight in Nigeria. A signifi-
cant proportion of capital flight can be estimated  *  Ensure that the nation's currency is not
from recorded data in the balance of payments  overvalued.
and debt statistics - but these estimates are only
as good as the data are reliable.  *  Establish an integrated, unified tariff
structure to reduce the rewards for trade-faking.
Significant amounts of capital flight, relative
to external debt, took place between 1970 and  *  Establish fiscal discipline, to maintain
1989. Trade-faking was an important vehicle:  macroeconomic stability and reduce inflation.
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US$8. i billion and imports were overinvoiced  *  Ensure a positive real rate of interest-
about US$6.0 billion.  high enough to attract funds but not so high as to
stifle investment initiatives.
Econometric analysis shows the culprit to be
domestic macroeconomic policy - in the form  *  Adopt a realistic exchange rate determined
of inflation, exchange rate misalignment, fiscal  by market forces.
deficit, and the lack of opportunities for profit-
able domestic investments - combined with the  *  Foster attitudinal changes that contribute
relative attractiveness of foreign investments.  positively to honest govemment.
The  Policy  Research  Working  PaperSeriesdissemiinates  theridingsofworkunder  way  in  theBank.  Anrjectiveof the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are  less than  fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do  not  necessarily  represent  of  ficial  Bank  policy.
Produced  by the  Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterAN ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL
FLIGHT FROM NIGERIA
S. MI AJAYI
DEPARTMENT  OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY  OF IBADAN
IBADAN3  NIGERIA
I'  This paper  was compicted  under  the World Bank  Visiting Research  Fellow  Progra.m. First, I am  grateful
to the staff  of AF4DR  and  others  who participated  at the  seminar  at which  the  original  draft  of this  paper  was
presented. Second, I thank those who participated  at the seminar I also gave at the Macroeconomics  and Growth
Seminar sponsored  by CECMG. I thank Miguel  Kigucl for making  that seminar  possible. It is impossible  to list
the names  of al  the people  who assisted  in giving infonnation  and data.  Of special note however  is my gratitude
to the following  for comments  and assistance: Ajay Chhibber,  Santiago  Montenegro,  Bob  Warner, John
Underwood,  Ibrahim Elbadawi, Miguel  Kiguel,  0.  Adamolckun,  A. Yeats,  and F.L. Osunsade. The individual
comments  received  as  well as  those  at  the seminars  havc  bcen  useful  in improving  the quality  of this  paper.Table of Contents
Section I
Introduction  1
The Objectives of the Study  8
Outline of the Study  9
Section II: The Definition of Capital Flight  10
Section III: A Review of the Literature on the Measures and Estimates
of Capital Flight  15
Section IV: The Mechanisms of Capital Flight  19
Section V: Alternative Meaures of Capital Flight  23
Section VI: International Trade Faking and Capital Flight  42
Section VII:  Causes of Capital Flight  51
Section VIII:  Econometric Analysis  55
Section IX: Summary of Results and Conclusions  59
Appendixes  63
Endnotes  73
References  74SECTION  I
P!RODUCTION
Since 1982,.  the issue of the external indebtedness  of the less developed countries  has
dominated most debates about global finance. In  recent times, attention has shifted to  a
somewhat  different  phenomenon  with policy  implications  for debt crisis management.  This is the
issue of capital flight. Some  analysts claim that capital flight issues  predate t- P debt crisis while
others argue that the debt crisis was precipitated  by capital flight.  According  to Lawrence  Birns,
director of the Washington-based  council on hemispheric  affairs, capital flight had reached a
chronic and seemingly  irreversible pace in much of Latin America in the period leading to the
open eruption of the debt crisis in  1982. For some authors, "the cascade of capital that has
flowed  from developing  countries is a key element in keeping  third world debt a lingering  crisis"
(Glynn and Koenig, 1984, p.  109).  Traditionally, capital  flows  from  developing to
developed countries apart  from  those necessitated by  normal business transactions are
considered perverse and economically  unsound.
The resurgence of interest in capital flight in recent times is dictated by the exigencies of the
period which is related to the paradoxical situation of high accumulation  of external debt by
developing  countries on the one hand and the acquisition  of foreign  assets by the citizens of the
heavily indebted developing  countries on the other. Consequently,  interest is shown in capital
flight at the policy level. Indeed, the Brady plan in the case of Mexico (which is also relevant
to other countries in similar position) places heavy emphasis  on economic  adjustment that are
designed to secure, among other things, a reversal of capital flight as an opportunity not only
to improve on the external liability  situation  of the country but also to promote growth. Indeed
CAPITAL  HLIGHTFROMNIaA  *AL  aeylthe arguments about the flight of capital has been an important factor in the resultant decline  of
lending to  developing countries. Following the lead of Brady, the  r '<F made the adoption
ofpolicies  for capital reversal a condition  for its support  of debt reduction  policies  (Pastor, 1989;
Truell,  1989). The second interest in capital flight arises from the role that such externally
stocked away assets can play in the domestic economy if left at home. This constitutes  part of
the economic arguments about capital flight.  These are discussed later in the study.
It is not the intention of this study at the outset to come to judgements on the abnormality
or  otherwise of  capital flight.  Whether capital flight is  considered a  socially desirable
phenomenon  depends on the type of economy being considered, the morality of such outflows
and whether it is generally  considered beneficial or harmful. Judgements  are inevitably likely
to vary depending on the circumstances. Indeed, it is sometimes  argued that capital flight is
beneficial  to the economy. Capital moves  out when it would  have been forcibly invested  into low
return activities and returns to the economy  when it is clear that it will be put to good use. Thus,
while capital flight can be considered in general to be a response to abnormal circumstances
arising from domestic macroeconomic policy errors coupled in  some cases with political
instability, capital fiight per se  need not be an abnormal activity. Unless we expect some
perverse economic behavior in  some countries and  none in others  - a  denial of  general
applicability  of economic  theory- would  it be justifiable not to expect the flight of capital. Indeed
as aptly put by Lessard and Wii'iamson (1987, p. 201) capital flight is "the result of individual
agents reacting in the way that is posited  as rational  by economic  theory and accepted  as normal
in industrial countries". Where to draw the line between "what is" and "what is not" capital
flight is sometimes  unclear. It is clear, however, for example, that overseas  investments  arising
from such activities  as drug trafficking,  corruption and illicit activities  as those arising from the
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the different angles from which capital flight can be viewed, it is important to study it for any
economy.
The economic arguments against capital flight from developing countries are not only
convincing but are often too strong to be ignored. First, the outflow of capital can cause a
shortage of liquidity in the economy, and thereby create a shortfall in the amount of funds that
are needed for the importation  of equipment which are needed for development. In addition,
the shortage of liquidity  in the economy  can lead to the exertion  of upward pressure on interest
rates. The most interesting aspect which is discussed in the literature is that between capital
flight and growth. Two of the most recent and relevant  arguments are those given by Deppler
and Williamson  (1987, p.52) and Lessard and Williamson  (1987 p.224). According  to Deppler
and Williamson  capital flight leads to a net loss in the total resources which are available to an
economy for the purposes of investment and growth. Given the fact that capital flight is a
diversion of domestic savings away from domestic real investment, the pace of growth and
development  in the economy is retarded from what it would have otherwise been. Sometimes.
it is actuallv said that the reduction in terms of domestic output is in multiples  of the size of
capital flight. Similarly, the shortage of  liquidity can cause a  depreciation of the domestic
currency if the authorities are operating  a floating  exchange rate system. If attempts are being
made to defend a particular exchange rate, a loss of reserves will ensue.
Second, income that is generated  abroad and the wealth that are held abroad are outside the
purview of domestic authorities and cannot therefore be taxed. Thus, potential government
revenue is reduced and hence the debt-servicing  capacity of government  debt is affected. Capital
flight can exacerbate balance of payments crisis if at the time it exists capital flows are also
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indebted countries if creditors are  reluctant as a  result of  capital outflows to give further
financial  assistance.
Third, income distribution  is negatively  affected by capital flows. This .s due to the fact that
the  poor in indebted countries are subjected  to austerity in order to pay for debt obligations  to
international banks who  in  .urn  pay  interests to  some  with  assets abroad  from  these
countries.(Pastor, 1989). All these arguments are valid if capital is irreversible.
The preponderant of  the  causes of  capital flight are  often attributed to  economic
factors.These are  often traced to  disincentives created mainly by  distortions in  domestic
macroeconomic  policy.  These distortions manifest themselves in large public sector deficits,
exchange rate misalignment,  inflation  and financial  repression. As part of the economic  causes
also are the incentives provided by foreign banks and governments. These include attractive
returns and the maintenance  of secrecy on deposits.  Part of the  explanation  for capital flight
which is often ignored in most analysis  on the topic is the political  aspect. This is predicated  on
corruption (a problem which is hardly limited to LDCs)  and access to foreign funds by political
leaders. It has been alleged that some political leaders through the perquisites of their offices
siphon funds to foreign  countries. Thus, access to political  offices  and the corruptibility of such
office holders become important factors. As part of the corruption, it has been alleged that in
the years when petrodollar surged  into Mexico, Venezuela  and Nigeria, the opportunity  for graft
multiplied  in these countries and a lot of money  consequently  was siphoned  abroad. While the
amounts of motey that are left in the bank deposits in foreign  countries is a fair direct pointer
to this possibility, it is difficult to be conclusive, however, in attributing all of the deposits to
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arisen in the course of the performance  of normal business transactions.
Nigeria is one of the heavily-indebted  countries (indeed one of the Baker 15 countries)
where the issue of capital flight has been talked  about as being important. Relative  to the several
studies that have been carried out for Latin American  countries, there are  limited studies on the
magnitude of  capital flight in  Nigeria.  There is  no comprehensive study on  the causes,
measurement, conduits, economic determinants  and empirical estimate including econometric
investigation and consequences of capital flight. There are  "words of  mouth" or anecdotal
evidences that the different regimes in Nigeria have  contributed to capital flight in different
ways. Some have asserted,for example,that in the oil boom years a lot of capital did leave
Nigeria as the petrodollar (mentioned earlier) increased the degree of corruption and graft.
Similarly, the almost five-year reign of the civilian regime between 1979-1984  has often been
referred to as a period when a lot of money  was siphoned  out of the country by some political
office holders.  These were reportedly done through the retention of some percentages of
contract money deposited in a foreign bank account. This amount of money would only show
up in the statistics if deposited in a foreign bank that is within the financial  reporting system.
Any amount of money not so deposited like those left in a Swiss bank secret code account,for
example, are very difficult to detect. Similarly, if the money  was (is) spent in buying property
almost immediately  they were (are) deposited, it would  also escape being counted. In any case,
some of this money in particular those dealing with bribery or percentage  of contracts awarded
to foreigners never entered the country in the first case. In such situations, it is perhaps difficult
and inappropriate to categorize such money  as capital flight. What is known, however, is that
quite a number of important "political  big shots"who  were afraid after the military  coup of 1984
CAPfTAL  FLQ  1FM  NIGERA  J. ajayl  pape Sfled the country. It has been alleged that some tfti  "e  .fr money abroad (See Glynn and
Koenig, 1984). It would also be true to say that some probably fled out of the fear of possible
political  persecution  and possible interrogation  to which a number  of public officers who stayed
in the country were subjected.  It has been claimed by casual  empiricists that given the discipline
of the military regime, the period of their rulership should  be characterized  by less capital flight.
The answers to these claims are empirical.
One of the most often mentioned  mechanismis  for capital flight is trade faking.  As of
now, there is no known published detailed study on the magnitude  of such import and export
faking for Nigeria. Although  the study by Chang  and Cumby (1991)  analyzed the extent of trade
faking -over-invoicing  of  imports and exports for a number of  African countries including
Nigeria, the study fell short of estimating on annual basis the amount of trade faking that
actually took place using partner country data.  One of the contributions of this study, it is
hoped, is to bridge this long-standing  gap and other gaps with regards to capital flight estimates
in Nigeria.  Given the present magnitude  of Nigeria's external debt and the possible impact of
capital flight on her debt-servicing  capacity, a study of capital flight is appropriate at this time.
Additionally, an attempt is made in this study to estimate the amount of Nigeria's stock of
external claims. This is not known to have been done elsewhere.
The capital flight estimates made in this study are different from all previous estimates that
have made specific  allusion to Nigeria and as mentioned  previously  there are not too many of
them. The first difference is the period of coverage. This is not only different, but are also
broken down into sub-periods  in order to discover possible periodic episodes in terms of the
rulership or economic  fortunes of the country. The second difference is that attempt is made in
this study to calculate the extent of external claims in the country. The third difference is that
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made taking due cognizance  of this phenomenon  in estimating  the total amount of capital flight
using different  versions. This is a modest  response  to the challenge  of Chang  and Cumby (1991,
p. 1 70) that "with trade misinvoicing,  capital outflows  are hidden in current account  data, which
will show a greater deficit than the true current account, and will not be reflected in any capital
account items. Therefore, we need to seek an alternative means of identifying capital flight
through  the misinvoicing  of trade". The fourth  difference  is the utilization  of various alternative
methodologies  for calculating capital flight. Lastly, an econometric model explaining capital
flight is specified and estimated.
It is necessary to point out upfront that while the study of capital flight is not only
exciting and challenging in itself, it can be likened in a sense to fishing in 'muddled water".
Perhaps in  some cases, it is  not only searching for the  unknown but finding out what is
supposedly  "lost" to a country! Searching for capital flight is difficult since indeed the various
groups and individuals "are unlikely  to make a point of informing the compilers of the balance
of payments statistics of their action".(Lessard  and Williamson 1987, p.205). It is perhaps for
this reason that Boyce (1990, p.43)  asserts that "the measurement of capital flight requires
statistical detective work". The required statistical detective work is certainly made more
difficult where the reliability of statistics is said to be in doubt, and where consistency  in data
series is not a statistical hallmark!
In the economic  study of capital flight, the approach adopted is three-fold. The first is
a discussion  at the conceptual  level, the rationale  and the basis for classifying  domestic outflows
as capital flight instead of normal flows.  The second approach involves a discussion and
analyses of the conduits and economic determinants of capital flight.  The third part of the
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and analyze the alternative measures  of capital flight. The measurements  are in general derived
from a common  data base for the period from 1972-1989  in order to show the variations in the
estimates  derived from alternative  definitions. The second  part of the empirical  work deals with
econometric  estimation.
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.
In summary,the  study focuses on the following:
(1)  measurement of  the  total  stock of  external claims by  Nigerians. (2) definition and
measurement  of the magnitude  of capital flight using different approaches.
(3) determinants  of capital flight analyzed within the context of economic,socio-economic  and
other factors.
(4) exploration of the mechanisms  for and/or conduits of capital flight. Specifically,  the study
examines  the mechanisms  of capital flight, that is, the different conduits through which money
is shipped abroad and the possible measurable  assets in which money is held once it arrives
abroad.
(5) a detailed analyses  of trade faking, that is, the under-invoicing/over-invoicing  of exports and
imports.
(6) an econometric investigation  of the determinants  of capital flight.
(7) detailed analyses of  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of capital flight. Finally, policy
conclusions  are drawn from the findings  of the study.
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The outline  of the study is as  follows.
In section II we grapple with the problems of the various definitions of capital flight.
Section III deais with the literature review. The altemative measures of  capital flight are
discussed and estirnated in section IV. In section V we discuss trade faldng and estimate the
amount of capital flight arising from it.  Adjustments  are then made to arrive at the appropriate
capital flight estimates. The conduits through which capital flight leaves the  country is
considered in section VI. The causes of capital flight and the empirical analysis are the themes
of sections VII and Vil,respectively.  The summary  of findings  and policy conclusions  are in
section IX.
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THE DEFINITION OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
There are various definitions of capital flight.  The use of the term "capital flight"
arouses strong emotions in some quarters. Some analysts view capital flight as a symptom  of a
sick society while others view capital flight as the cause of heavily indebted  countries' inability
to recover from their present  debt problems.  Capital flight is regarded by others as a "pejorative
description of  natural, economically rational responses to  the  portfolio choices that have
confronted  wealthy  residents  of some  debtor  countries in recent years" (Lessard  and Williamson,
1987 p.202).  The controversy surrounding  the term is due partly to the lack of a precise and
universally  accepted  definition  for it in economic  theory and partly because of the way the term
is used between developed and developing  countries. It is usual amongst some economists to
refer to capital  outflows  from developed  countries  as foreign investments  while the same  activity
when undertaken  by the residents of developing  countries is referred to as capital flight.  One
of the distinctions that is often made, however, is that exchange rate control regimes exist in
many developing  countries.
One of the reasons for this dichotomy is the belief that the investors from developed
countries are responding to better opportunities abroad.  The investors from the developing
countries  on the other hand are said to be escaping  the high risks which they perceive at home.
This interpretation makes it very obvious why a lot of economists  are  "ill-at-ease" with the
definition  of capital flight. In general, it is believed  that the investors  from all countries whether
developed  or developing  will base their investments  decisions  on the relative returns and risks
of such investments  at home and abroad.
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countries should be labelled  as "capital  flight". The first is the general presumption  in economics
that capital should flow towards capital-scarce countries. There is  scarcity of  capital in
developing  countries. Any flows in the opposite  directions, that is,from developing  to developed
countries as mentioned  in the introduction  are not only unusual  but abnormal.  The second  reason
is related to a policy issue. What is important is the extent to which those assets held abroad
could be utilized at home to reduce the level of external indebtedness  and relieve the inherent
liquidity problems brought about by debt service obligations.(Pastor, 1990). In distinguishing
between  capital flight and normal capital flows, two broad approaches  are taken in the literature.
The first is  an identification of  specific episodes (or countries) that are  characterized by
abnormally adverse economic conditions for  investment and consider all  estimates of  the
acquisition of external claims by  the private sector as capital flight. The second approach
distinguishes  capital flight from other capital movements  by considering  capital flight to consist
of the acquisition of external claims that are not reported to the domestic authorities.  (Chang
and Cumby, 1987);Dooley  (1988). On the other hand,capital  flight can be considered  as those
capital outflows which are in excess of "normal flows". One problem with this definition lies
in what constitutes 'normal" capital outflows in this context.  (Anthony  and Hallett, 1990).
These various difficulties essentially lie at the heart of  the varying definitions and
computation  methodologies  which  have  been  employed  to quantify the capital  flight phenomenon.
(Anthony  and Hallett, 1990). Thus, the possibility  of multiple definitional  terms is one of the
quandaries in this area in a sense and yet perhaps one of the strong points.  One cannot but
therefore agree with Chang and Cumby (1991) that there exists more than one viable definition
of capital flight and the appropriate choice will depend on the policy questions most pertinent
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A distinction is often made between legal and illegal activities in order to distinguish  between
capital flight and the  so called "normal" capital flows.  Since illegal transactions are  not
reported, it is therefore not only difricult, but almost impossible  to measure it as a component
of capital flight.  "Capital flight is capital that flees"(Ingo  Walter, 1987; Kindleberger, 1987).
Alternatively,  capital flows in response  to economic  or political  crisis are capital flight (Husted
and Melvin, 1990). Normal capital flows on the other hand, refer to flows that correspond to
ordinary portfolio  diversification  of domestic residents.
According to  Cuddington (1986), capital flight refers to  short term private capital
outflows. It involves "hot money" that responds to political or financial crises, heavier taxes,
a prospective  tightening  of capital or a major devaluation  of the domestic  currency arising from
a high misalignment  of the currency.  In the Morgan Guaranty  Trust Company  (1986 p.l3), an
expansive definition is adopted.  Capital flight is "the reported and unreported acquisition  of
foreign assets by the non-bank  private sector and elements of the public sector."
In order to clarify our thoughts on capital flows presented in table 1 is a taxonomy of
factors explaining  international  capital  flows. This table is adapted  from Lessard  and Williamson
(1987).  The upper left quadrant of the table identifies  various factors based on differences  in
economic  returns across countries. In the upper right quadrant are those  additional  factors that
CAPffAL PUG  FROM  AOFRIA  sA.  alayl  peg* 12Tahle  I
Taxonomy  of Factors Explaining  International  Capital  Flows
One-way  Flows  Two-way Flows
Economic  risk and  0  Natural resources  endowments  *  Differences  in absolute
retums  riskiness  of economics
* Terms of trade  * Low correlation  of risky
outcome  across country
* Technologies  changes  S Differences  in investor risk
preferences
* Demographics  shifts
* General  economic managements
Financial risks and  *  Taxes (deviationx  from world levels)  0 Differences  in taxes and their
returns, 'elative to  incidence  between  residents  and
economic  non-residents
* Inflation  *  Differences  in nature and
incidence  of country risk
* Default on government  obligations  * Asymmetric  application  of
guarantees
!  Devaluation  *  Different  interest ceiling for
residents  and non-residents
* Financial  repression  * Different access to foreign
exchange  denomination  claims
* Taxes on financial  intermediation
* Political  Instability,  potential
confiscation
Sourc:  Lessard and Williamson  (1987) p. 216.
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empirical studies of capital flight place emphasis ont the lower left and right quadrants. The
factors emphasized  are those that create a  "wedge between economic and financial returns'
regardless  of "whether they operate across the board or asymmetrically  among  residents or non-
residents".  (Lessard and Williamson, 1987 p.217).
From the above table and analysis therein, normal  capital outflows  are the ones that take
place in order to  maximize economic returns and opportunities between countries. Normal
portfolio diversification  takes place on the basis of differentials in economic returns.  Capital
flight on the other hand as seen from this analysis is thpI "subset of capital outflows that are
propelled by source country policies" (Lessard and Williamson 1987, p. 217.)
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A REVIEW OF 'HE  LITERATURE ON THE MEASURES AND
ESTIMATES OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
By its very nature, it is difficult to measure capital flight. The difficulties  involved, not
withstanding,  a number of capital flight estimates have been made over the last several years.
The preponderant of  these studies cover a  number of countries including mostly Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines  and Venezuela. A recent study by Rojas-
Suarez (1991)  covers Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Gabon, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Venezuela  and Yugoslavia. These various studies differ from
one another in terms of the methodological  approaches  of measurement,  country coverage and
time span.  The most significant of these studies which have made impact on capital flight
estimates  include the studies by Dooley (1986,1988), Dooley et al. (1986), World Bank (1985),
Morgan Guaranty  Trust Company  (1987), Cline (1986), Cuddington  (1986), Cumby and Levich
(1987), Gulati (1987), Lessard  and Williamson  (1987), Khan and Ul Haque (1987), Gajdeczka
(1990), Khan (1989),Vema (1989),and Vema-Schneider(1991). The World Bank(1985)  study
covered Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, South Korea, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
4
In the Cuddington  (1986) approach, capital flight is defined as short term speculative
outflows  which according to him is the typical meaning  of capital flight. Capital flight is defined
as short term-term external assets by the non-bank  private sector plus the errors and omissions
in the balance  of payments. This approach  is concentrated  on what is popular referred to as "hot
money flows" method because of the fact that funds are expecaed  to respond quickly to changes
CAPffAL  FIOT  FROM  NIGERIA  .l. alayl  ppe  15in expected  returns or to changes in risk.  Variations  in economic  conditions are likely to affect
the magnitude  of such flows. These in essence are funds "on the wings" that are expected to
return very quickly to the country of origin when economic  conditions are favorable -that is
when appropriate macroeconomic  policy stance is adopted.
Khan and Ul Haque (1987)  calculated  capital flight for eight highly-indebted  developing
countries for the period 1974-1982. Capital flight is defined in two ways.  First, it is defined
simply as gross private short term capital flows plus net errors and omissions in the country's
balance of payments accounts.  This is the same as the Cuddington  estimate.  The second
method tries to take account of normal capital flows. Capital flight is defined as that part of the
increase in external claims that yields no recorded investment  income.  This in essence is the
Dooley (1986) approach.  In the Morgan Guaranty  Trust Company  study (1986 p.13) capital
flight is defined as "the reported and unreported acquisition  of foreign assets by the non-bank
private sector and some elements of the public sector".  Capital flight is estimated "indirectly
as the counterpart of net direct investment inflows plus increases in gross external debt less
recorded  outflows  through  current account  balance  deficits  and less the building  of foreign  assets
by the banking  system and the official monetary  authorities"  (Morgan  Guaranty  Trust Company,
1986, p.  13).  Cline (1986) critiques the capital flight definition adopted by  the Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company study.  He argues that income from tourism and border transaction
should  be subtracted  since these eamings are beyond  the control of the relevant  foreign  exchange
authorities.  He also argues that reinvested investment income should not be considered as
capital flight since this is also  beyond the control of the authorities.
A thorough examination of the literature shows that there are  a variety of ways of
measuring capital flight.  The measuring  techniques  can be classified into six categories.ln the
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defined as  the net short term capital outflows plus errors and omissions in the balance of
payments.  This is the Cuddington (1986) approach.  Under this definition, capital flight is
equated to "hot money" flows. The second  category is the "derived" measure of capital flight.
Capital flight is that part of the increase in external claims that yields no recorded investment
income. This is the approach adopted by Dooley (1986, 1988). The third category consists of
a broad measure of capital flight. In this approach, capital flight is the measured  acquisition  of
foreign assets by the non-bank  private residents  plus errors and omissions. Specially,  the broad
measure  equals capital inflows in the form of changes in external  debt and net foreign investment
minus the current account  deficit and changes  in the assets of the banking system. This measure
of capital flight corresponds  to that adopted  by various authors including  Morgan Guaranty  Trust
Company  (1986), World Bank (1985), Erbe (1985).  The fourth measure is the private claims
measure which defined capital flight as the acquisition  of external claims by the private sector
including deposit banks and the non-bank sector plus recorded errors and omissions in the
balance of payments. Cornesa (1986)  corresponds  to this.  The fifth measure is loosely  referred
to as the "mirror stock statistics" method. This method utilizes the statistics that is published
by the International  Monetary  Fund. Capital  flight measure under this method  is derivable  from
the "Cross Border Bank deposits of  Nonbanks by residence of depositor'  published in the
International  Financial  Statistics. This measure has been used in the literature by Khan (1986).
The sixth popular method is that adopted by Pastor (1989, 1990). This method is labelled the
"sources and uses" approach to capital flight.  Capital flight is derived residually from the
balance of payments  equation. Capital flight is defined as the change in debt plus foreign  direct
investment minus the sum of current account plus the changes in reserves.
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taken of the different names that are often used for the same thing (for example, implicit  capital
flows, Dooley et al 1986).
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THE MECHANISMS OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
The conduits  for capital  flight are not only many  but varied. They come in various forms
and  it is almost impossible to develop an exhaustive inventory of channels.  A very apt
description of some of the conduits and the various forms they take is described by Glynn and
Koenig (1984, p.  109):
"It comes in false-bottomed  suitcases  or in electronic  fund transfers
from private  banking  services that  cater  to  "high-net worth
individuals".  It may take the form of frugerrands stashed inside
hollowed out sculptures or more via false invoices approved by
corrupt customs officers.  Its destination range from banks in
Zurich, Miami  or the Cayman islands  to co-opt apartments  in New
York or Condos in San Diego".
The interesting  story or a narration of an actual happening  in the Philippines  some years
ago is not only illuminating  but gives a proper insight the issue of the various forms/conduits
that capital flight can take. The general applicability  of this event has very high probability rate
for developing  countries at least.
"In Manila not too long ago, a police dog sniffing for explosives  in the cargo hold of a
plane about to leave for Hong Kong grew interested in a crate containing  two frozen chickens
and a duck. The Philippines  customs  officer decided  that the chickens  were above suspicion  but
noticed a large gash in the duck.  Inside the foul: $29,000 in very cool U.S. cash" (Glynn and
Koenig, 1984 p.  112).
Police dogs have not been known  as a popular mechanism  for the detection  of suspicious
materials from the various airports in Nigeria.  The probability is high, however, that some
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transactions.
There are a number of channels through which capital flight can take place in Nigeria
and these are  hereby discussed.  First, transfers can take place through cash or  monetary
instruments.  These are usually in the form of either foreign or domestic currency, travellers
checks or other checks.  In the early 1970s, stories abound about Nigerian currency being
carried out of the country and being exchanged in big centers like London and New York.
These were exchanged  legally  abroad for other currencies  at current market rates.  Inspite  of the
present economic predicament, there are  still some African countries where the  Naira is
exchanged  for other currencies in the course of trade.
Secondly, capital flight can take place through bank transfers from a local affiliate of a
foreign owned bank to a designated  recipient  abroad.  This amount of money  can be exchanged
at the market rate where no constraints or  restrictions are in place.  Transfers can still be
possible in the face of exchange controls but possibly at a less favorable  rate.  In the history of
banking institutions  development  in Nigeria local affiliates  of foreign  banks existed. Given this
institutional  set-up, transfers of the type mentioned  took place and are indeed still taking  place
even though the exact statistics on the magnitudes  are lacking.  It is reasonable to assume,
however, that such transfers may not be available for incomes that are known to be illegally
generated.
Another method of transfer is through  precious metals and collectibles including works
of art.  This is a substitute for currency movement.  Local currency is converted into gold,
silver or other precious metals, precious stones, jewelry and similar assets that cannot only be
moved  abroad but that will also be able to retain  their value. The sale value of these are usually
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of any such items. Such international  transfers  therefore usually  involve smuggling. It is known
that there are large risks involved  in such activities. Some people who have taken risks in this
regard have been successful  while some others have been caught in the act.
The fourth mechanism  of transfer is through  false invoicing  of trade transactions. In this
case, invoices  are issued  that are different from agreed  prices. Substantial  amount  of money  can
arise from the systematic  faking of imports and exports.  The expectation  in the case of capital
flight is that exporters  will systematically  engage  in under-invoicing  while  importers  over-invoice
and  in the process derive foreign exchange gain that is outside the control of  the foreign
exchange  authority. The procedure for doing this is that the foreign supplier issues an invoice
that is greater than the agreed price of the product.  The importer on receipt of the necessary
foreign exchange remits it to the foreign supplier who then keeps the difference in a bank for
the use of the importer.  On the export side, the invoice issued is for an amount in foreign
currency that is less than the agreed price. The foreign  buyer places the difference  between  the
invoice price and the agreed price in a foreign bank account of the exporter and remits the
invoice amount.  It is this amount of money that is surrendered  to the Central bank for local
currency at  the prevailing official exchange rate.lf collusion exists between exporters and
importers, trade faking is  an effective means of  acquiring excess foreign exchange.  The
conditions under which all these occur have been discussed earlier.
Capital flight through false trade invoicing is generally  applicable  to the local affiliates
of multinational companies, and owners of businesses engaged in intemational trade.  It is
known in some cases that false invoicing can be multiplied  through a practice called "round
tripping".  The process is one in which foreign currency assets are accumulated  abroad at the
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are repatriated in the form of cash or other monetary insti  uments  which are converted to local
currency at a premium at the local parallel market  for foreign  exchange. Whatever  gain is made
in local currency can then form the basis for further false-invoiced  transactions. This in effect
is "arbitrating  the official and parallel-market  exchange rates" (Walter, 1987, p.  113).
A fifth method of transferring money abroad is through the black market itself.  This
until recently has been a thriving source of transterring funds abroad.  The amount of money
so transferred is difficult to estimate. A sixth vehicle through which capital can be transferred
overseas is through  commissions  and agents' fees which are paid by foreign  contractors into the
foreign bank accounts of residents.  Commissions  and agents' fees are in some cases  polite
words for the myriads of kickbacks  on foreign contracts!
Recent years have witnessed the existence  of Bureau du change.  This is an important
mechanism through which a lot of capital can be transferred abroad.  The number of such
institutions  and the transactions  undertaken  by them have been rising in recent times.
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ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CAPITAL  LIGHT
The estimates of capital flight in this section is divided into two parts.  The first part
replicates for Nigeria the different methodologies  for estimating capital flight for Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Phillipines, and Venezuela adopted by Frbe, World Bank, Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company, Cline, and Duwendag.  These studies  were originally  carried out for Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Philippines,  ana Venezuela. The period of coverage for Nigeria is 1972-1989.
In the second part, we employ various techniques  as defined in the text and/or appendix to
estimate capital flight.
Using Cumby and Levich  (1987), and adopted  also by Verna  (1989)  and Verna-Schneider
(1991), we calculate from balance  of payments  statistics  a number of capital flight estimates  for
Nigeria using the various methods listed in table 2.  There is no similar calculation done
elsewhere. The result of the calculation  is shown in table 3.  There are a number of objectives
behind the calculation. The primary objective  is to calculate in a concise way the 'range'  or
"band" of  capital flight implied by these alternative  definitions. It is not intended  that similar
figures to the original study would be generated for Nigeria since the data base is different.  It
is hoped, however, that some lessons  can be drawn from the similarities  and differences.
Capital  flight uising  the Morgan trusty  approach  was about US$477  million  in 1972. This
rose to US$12,974 in 1980. It rose and fell systematically  thereafter reaching only US$2,212
million in 1989. Capital flight was by this method, 13 percent of GNP in 1980, but was about
only 8 percent of GNP in 1989.
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NOTATIONS
A.  Current Account Balance
B.  Net Foreign Direct Investment
C.  Private Short Term Capital Outflows
D.  Portfolio Investment
E.  Banking System Foreign Assets
F.  Changes in Reserves
G.  Errors and Omissions
H.  Changes in Debt
1.  IMF Credit
J.  Travel Credit
K.  Reinvested  FDI Income
L.  Other Investment  Income
M.  Counterpart Items
CAPITAL FLIGHT ESTIMATES
World Bank =  (H + B +  A + F)
Erbe  =(H  +  B + A +  F)
Morgan  = (H +  B +  A + E +  F)
Cline  =(H  +  B +  A +  E) - (J +  K +  L)
Duwendag  =(H+B+A+F+G+I+M)
Source: Lessard and Williamson  (1987), p. 38
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CAPITAL  FLIGHT:  DIFFERENT  ESTIMATION  METHODS  (1972-1989)
(US$MILLIONS)
ERBE &  MORGAN
|  YEAR  WORLD  TRUSTY  CLINE  DUWENDAG
BANK  l
1972  106.44  477.28  453.37  127.70
1973  636.10  1265.38  1228.03  551.75
1974  325.00  5995.00  5824.27  450.88
1975  119.80  5988.60  5474.48  148.04
1976  124.80  5524.44  5044.21  187.40
1977  2490.00  7021.86  6554.79  2111.95
1978  508.40  2695.20  2309.48  235.23
1979  -86.30  5659.54  5370.07  601.59
1980  2713.30  12974.11  12234.36  2590.79
1981  2132.30  6145.22  5267.31  1345.14
1982  -3805.80  -2230.87  -2569.33  -3812.09
1983  2016.10  3098.82  2893.61  1991.64
1984  -169.80  1594.72  1494.72  182.81
1985  3569.40  5385.40  5272.14  2994.37
1986  . 5502.90  6841.80  6592.39  5138.37
1987  5874.60  7522.20  7398.83  5462.11
1988  1043.80  2479.12  2385.12  902.80
1989  -299.70  2212.46  2102.46  -369.70
CUMULATIVE
1972-79  4224.20  34627.30  32258.70  4414.54
1979-83  2969.60  25646.82  23196.02  2717.07
1972-89  22801.30  80650.28  75330.31  20840.99
1983-87  16793.2G  24442.94  23651.69  15769.51
Notes:  1.  Some of  the items in  some cases could not be operationalized fully
because some  of the statistics  do not exist. This is true of IMF Credit and
Reinvested  FDI income.
2.  The  following statistics were  taken  from the  Balance of  Payments
Statistics  Yearbook: Travel, other Investment  Income, Counterpart  items.
These were normally  recorded in millions  of SDR and were converted to
millions  of dollars using the conversion rate under U.S. country data of
the IMF line Sc.
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The percentage share of capital flight in GNP using the Cline approach are not too different:
12 percent of GNP in 1980;  and 7.6 percent of GNP in 1989. Capital flight as a proportion  of
external debt was 145  percent in 1980, and 37 percent in 1989 using the Morgan Guaranty  Trust
Company  method. In all cases, these figures are significant  and cannot be ignored.  It is clear
that tite different results obtained derive from the different data that go into the calculation  of
capital flight.  It is also clear that the approaches  yield significant  amount of capital flight over
the period covered.
The differences  in the magnitudes  of the results using  various definitions  of capital  flight
are  not surprising.  It is noteworthy that the similarities and differences can be classified
according to different  periods. The amplitude  of capital flight for the periods 1972-79,and  1979-
83 were not too different in the four measures.  The period 1972-79, which includes the oil
shock years showed more capital flight than the following  period. The year 1980 which is the
second year of the political  regime of the civilian administration  is noteworthy  for the criticisms
it had received for all kinds of allegations  including  corruption which made possible  the transfer
of huge amounts of money  abroad.  In all cases, the amount of capital flight rose dramatically
from what it was the previous year.  In the following year, however, substantial  reduction
occurred in the amount of capital flight.This  could have arisen from changes  in the composition
of the various items used in the calculation  in table 2.
From the cumulative  totals, several results  emerge.  For the entire period, 1972-89,  the
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company methodology  gave a total capital flight of about US$80.7
billion  as  opposed  to  Cline's  of  US$75.3  billion.  In  the  Erbe  and  World  Bank
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Duwendag method.  Over the period of  the civilian regime 1979-83 (with overlaps), the
maximum capital flight of  US$25.6 billion was recorded using the Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company method  and US$23.2 billion using the Cline method. In the 1983-87  period, the total
flight varied between US$24.4  billion  using the Morgan Guaranty  Trusty Company  methodology
and about US$15.8 billion by the Duwendag methodology.
In the next stage, six different  approaches  are used in calculating  capital flight. These
are variously labelled as estimated  capital flight, the total private capital outflows, the residual
method, the hot method (two versions), and the derived method. The "mirror stock statistics"
method is presented in the text even though it is not given any prominence.
The starting point is the calculation  of the total stock of extemal claims.  From this is
derived the "estimated" capital flight.  In the process of estimating the stock of total external
claims, I have followed  a modified  version of the Dooley  (1986, 1988)  approach. 2 Table  4 gives
the total stock of external claims for the period 1972-1989. In 1978  the total stock of Nigeria's
external claims was about US$8.0 billion. This rate steadily  rose to US$17 billion in 1981 --
more than twice the 1978 figure.  By 1987, it stood at US$29.8 billion but dropped slightly to
US$27.3 billion in 1989. From the stock of external claims, two versions of capital flight are
calculated. This is reported in Table 5.
The capital flight estimates  in columns I and 2 of table 5 are calculated  as flows from
the total stock of external claims after subtracting  the capitalized non-direct  investment  income
from the balance of payments  statistics tising the LIBOR  rate and the U.S. treasury bill rate as
explained in the footnote to the table.  From table 5, it can be seen that regardless  of whatever
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are virtually the  same. In 1983-87,  for example,  the  amount  of capital  flight under  the two
methods  was  US$18.6  billion. For the  entire  period  from 1973-79,  the  amount  of capital  flight
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ALRNATIVE  MEASURES OF EXTERNAL CLAIMS 1972-89
US$ MILLIONS
RECORDED  CLAIMS  UNRECORDED  TOTAL
ON NONRESIDENT  TOTAL  EXTERNAL  STOCK  OF  STOCK  OF
OTHER  THlAN  DIRECT  ERRORS  &  CLAIMS  BOP  EXTERNAL  EXTERNAL
YEAR  INVESTMENT  OMISSIONS  COLI+2  CLAIMS  CLAIMS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
1972  126.0  6.5  132.5  972.0  1104.5
1973  -431.8  -48.3  -480.1  1207.4  727.3
1974  -10111.4  72.2  -10039.2  1674.2  -8365.0
197S  -352.5  . -41.0  -393.5  1184.0  790.5
1976  838.6  45.3  883.9  1190.6  2074.5
1977  1537.6  -58.3  1479.3  3195.8  4675.1
1978  4587.2  -131.5  4455.7  3510.3  7966.0
1979  -6486.2  731.2  -5755.0  5386.5  -368.5
1980  -8464.3  -687.5  -9151.8  8235.0  -916.8
1981  9776.5  -103.6  9672.9  7887.6  17560.5
1982  3765.2  9.9  3775.1  7459.0  11234.1
1983  473.3  102.6  575.9  13865.7  14441.6
1984  -248.0  256.9  8.9  17766.4  17775.3
198S  -4400.0  -146.2  4546.2  20256.5  15710.3
1986  -700.S  -218.8  -919.3  25161.6  24242.3
1987  -1995.7  -68.1  -2063.8  31873.9  29810.1
1988  -1407.0  -215.0  1622.0  31383.0  29761.0
1989  678.0  -1252.0  -1930.0  29182.0  27252.0
Source:  See Appendix  A.
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ESTIMATD  CAPIAL FLIGHT  1972 1989
(USS  MILLION)
ESTIMATED  ESTMIATED
YEAR  CAPITAL  CAPITAL
1972________  FLIGHT*(a)  FLIGHT*(b)
(1)  ~~~~~~(2)
1972
1973  -377.3  -377.4
1974  -9104.1  -9108.7
1975  9108.0  9092.1
1976  1272.9  1278.2
1977  2616.8  2621.1
1978  3314.8  3317.5
1979  -8323.2  -8318.8
1980  -574.4  -579.5
1981  18483.9  18486.2
1982  -6301.3  -6298.1
1983  3213.6  3216.4
1984  3339.3  3340.1
1985  -2070.5  -2071.2
1986  8530.8  8530.6
1987  5572.2  5572.1
1988  -47.4  -46.7
1989  -2513.5  -2513.9
ACCUMULATED
1973-80  -2066.5  -2075.6
1979-83  15396.2  15404.6
1983-87  18585.3  18587.9
1973-89  ,  39470.2  39469.0
Notes:  *Capital  flight is calculated  using  two steps.
(1)  Estimate  the  total stock  of external  claims.
(2)  Subtract  from it the  capitalized  value  of non-direct  investment  income  roceipts  in that  year  BOPY  lines  15, 17,  19. These
are  capitalized  by (a) using  U.S. Treasury  bill rate  IFS  line 60c  and  (b) using  the Libor rate  on U.S. deposits  from  the
international  interest  rates  section  of the  IFS. As it tums  out both  results  are  about  the  same.
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to the level of external debt is shown in Appendix  F.
The result of the second method of calculating capital flight, that is,  the total private
outflows method is shown in table 6.  Over the period 1983-1987,  the cumulated flows were
US$9.8 billion.  The values for 1979-1983  and 1980-89 were US$13.3 and US$6.3 billion,
respectively.
The next measure recognizes  that capital flight is "speculative  capital".  It is "hot money"
on the wings. It is one that is expected to respond to various forms of domestic macroeconomic
policy distortions  discussed earlier.  Taking this approach, of course, means that capital flight
refers essentially  to "capital  export by the private nonbank  sector, although  in some  cases banks
and official entities may also engage in it" (Cuddington 1986  p. 2). Also since capital flight is
essentially concealed, they show up in the "errors and omissions" of the balance of payments
entry.  Thus, capital flight is the sum of  short-term private capital flows plus errors and
omissions in the balance of payments entry. Two versions of the "hot money" approach are
adopted. The first approach strictly follows the Cuddington  approach, the result of which is
shown in table 7. There is however  no justification for leaving out other parts of capital that can
strictly speaking be considered  as "speculative"  money.  These other capital flows are  added to
the Cuddington measure to generate the second version of our "hot money' method (The hot
method version II).  The result of the calculations is shown in table 8.  In table 9 we present
capital flight estimates using the residual methodology  as adopted by Boyce (1990).
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1972-1989 =  1639.3
1979-1983 =  13,324.5
1983-1987 =  -8927.7
1972-1979  =  3245.2
Notes:*  Total  private  outflows  is other  short-term  capital,  net  errors  and  omissions, other
long  term  capital  long  term  and  short-term  capital  of resident  official sector,  other
short-term  capital  of deposit  of money  banks.
1.  The  sources  for short  term  and  long  term  capital  of resident  official sector  and  short-term
capital  of deposit  money  banks  are  relevant  lines  of the  IMF: Balance  of Payments  Staistcs
Year,  BQQk  several  years.
2.  Other  statistics  are from IMF: International  Financial  Statistics  Year  Book 1990.
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1972-1989  =  -7573.0
1979-1983  =  -270.0
1983-1987  =  -3921.0
1972-1979  =  -24.0
Note:  Data used are short-term capital of other sectors and net Errors and Omissions
Source: 1) IMF IFS Yearbook 1990.
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CUMUL. 72-89  5876.38
CUMUL. 79-83  3894.31
CUMUL. 83-87  -92.20
CUMrUL.  72-79  104.01
CAPT  ALFUGHL*TIWOW  *J.  jnyl  pege 34N=ca:  *Items  included  are other  short-term  capital  of other sectors,  net errors  and  omissions,
other short-term  capital  of resident  official  sector, plus other short-term  capital  of
Deposit  Money  Banks.
Source:  Balance  of Payments  Statistics  Year Book  Several  years.
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No:  *Increase  in external  debt  minus  current  account,  minus  net  direct  investment  minus
increase  in official  reserves.  (ala  Boyce  1990)
Source:  1. World Bank:  World Debt  Tables  1991-92
2. IMF:  IFS Statistics  Yearbook  1990
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Uses" approach mentioned  earlier.  It starts by focusing  attention  on the balance  of payments.
The balance of payments (BOP) can be defined as:3
BOP =CA  +  KA =  NIOR  (1)
KA  =  NFNR +  NFR  (2,
If we substitute (2) into (1) taking cognizance of the fact that net flows from non-residents
(NFNR) include changes in external indebtedness (CHDEBT) and foreign direct investment
(FDI) flows, capital flight (CF) is negative net flows from residents. Thus,
CF = (CHDEBT + FDI) - (CA +  CHRES)  (3)
Where the notations  are:
BOP  = Balance of Payments
CA  = Current Account
KA  =  Capital Account
NIOR  = Net Increase in Official  Reserves
NFNR  =  Net flows from Non-Residents
MFR  =  Net flows from Residents
CF  = Capital Flight
CHDEBT  =  Change in Debt
FDI  =  Foreign Direct Investment
CHRES  = Change in Reserves
The.estimates  of capital flight using this methodology  is shown in table 10.
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1972-1989 =  54,241.0
1979-1983 =  25,702.0
1983-1987 =  23,268.9
1972-1979 =  12,264.1
hTsQW:  *  (CHDEBT +  FDI) - (CA + CHRES) as in text.
Source: Data used in calculation are from:
1) IMF:  IFS statistics Year book.
2) World Bank:  World Bank  Tables 1990.
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method.  The estimates of capital flight using this method is shown in table 11 below.  This
method draws on international  banking statistics to evaluate the amount of assets held by the
residents of developing  countries  abroad. This method  of estimating  capital flight has been used
by Khan and Ul Haque (1987)  and the Bank  of England (1987).  It is particularly  useful as we
shall see in determining  the minimum  level of assets held  abroad. For this method, the recorded
statistics by the IMF are called the Cross Border Bank Deposits  of Non-banks  by Residence  of
Depositors.  This amount represents stocks per year.  When capital flight is defined as the
increase over the previous year, we find that the amount is relatively  very small.  In all cases,
the amount represents the lowest  of all the estimates.
There are a number of explanations  why the estimates so derived cannot be an adequate
measure of capital flight.  First, some funds are held in deposits outside the major financial
centers. Indeed, the nationality  of depositor(s)  in some foreign banks are never revealed. The
most often cited example is that of the Swiss Bank accounts where secret codes are utilized to
hide not only the identity of the depositor(s)  but also in most cases the  nationality.  Second,
substantial  amounts  of money  which are not revealed  are held in other financial  assets: equities,
bonds, treasury bills etc. and physical assets.  As a result of the above reasons, the figures
represent an underestimate  of capital flight.  In a large sense, however, foreign deposits give
some indications of the amount of money which could have been used domestically.  Such
deposits are better seen within the context of other macroeconomic  variables such as extemal
debt and GNP.
The summary of all  the estimates of  capital flight using.  different methodologies is
presented in table 12.
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CAPITAL FLIGHT:  THE MIRROR STATISTIC METHOD 1981-1989
BILLIONS OF U.S.$
FLOWS OF
YEAR  CBDNRD  CBDNRD
1981  0.30
1982  1.38  1.08
1983  1.38  0.0
1984  1.17  -0.21
1985  1.50  0.33
1986  1.68  0.18
1987  2.30  0.62
1988  1.96  -0.34
1989  2.66  0.07
1990  3.53  0.87
Notes:  (1) CBDNRD = Cross Border Bank  Deposits  of Nonbanks  by Residence  of Depositor.
(2)  Figures are available  only from 1981.
Source:  IMF:  IFS Statistics Year Book, 1990  Washington, D.C.
CAPITAL  FLIGHFROMtOENA  e.  fayl  peg.  40TABLE 12
NMGERIA: SUMMARY OF CAPITAL FLIGHT  MEASURES 1972-1989
IN USS MILLIONS
ESTIMATED  TOTAL  RESIDUAL  HOT  HOT  DERIVED
YEAR  K. FLIGHT  OUTFLOWS  METHOD  METHOD  I  METHOD  1[  MEHOD*
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
1972  246.15  773.10  119.00  119.00  665.70
1973  -377.30  -371.86  652.56  -177.00  -238.52  1056.00
1974  -9104.10  -175.86  -9609.07  48.00  24.74  327.40
1975  9108.00  -509.78  247.81  42.00  -86.50  453.90
1976  1272.90  -724.37  865.46  5.00  17.78  79.60
1977  2616.80  -418.60  4656.87  -231.00  -357.37  2868.20
1978  3314.80  3059.40  8241.62  43.00  196.65  3805.30
1979  -8323.20  2140.09  -3872.38  211.00  220.22  3008.00
1980  -574.40  593.42  -7839.49  -673.00  -664.07  1181.00
1981  18483.90  1693.60  16127.00  106.00  146.75  5246.00
1982  -6301.30  5316.18  10931.89  149.00  3154.51  6425.30
1983  3213.60  3581.21  10908.60  -63.00  1045.90  9842.40
1984  3339.30  -2100.61  406.61  -642.00  -535.14  565.60
1985  -2070.50  -3665.01  -1249.31  -2014.00  173.91  -585.10
1986  8530.80  -1334.40  4916.41  -249.00  1195.99  3814.90
1987  5572.20  -5408.89  6400.25  -953.00  -1788.46  9631.10
1988  47.40  4941.00  1774.00  -1315.00  1889.00  1669.10
1989  -2513.50  1381.00  14004.00  -1895.00  524.00  4186.60
CUMULATIVE
1973-80  -2066.50  3838.59  -5883.52  -697.00  -768.07  1344.10
1979-83  6498.60  13324.50  26255.62  -270.00  3903.31  25702.70
1983-87  18585.40  -8927.70  20569.34  -3921.00  92.20  23268.90
1972-89  26140.60  -1639.33  57522.71  -7573.00  5038.39  54241.00
1980-89  27632.70  4884.50  55566.74  -7549.00  5142.39  41976.90
1972-79  -1492.10  3245.17  1955.97  -24.00  -104.00  12264.10
1979-84  9837.90  11223.89  25849.01  -912.00  3368.17  26268.30
1985-89  9471.60  25845.35  -6426.00  1994.44  18716.60
Notes:  *As shown in text.
Source:  As in tables 5-10
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ITERINATIONAL  TRADE FAKING AND CAPITAL FLIGHT
In  this section, the term  "trade faking" is  used to describe the over-invoicing/under-
invoicing in international  trade i.e. of exports and imports.  The analyses in this section is in
three steps. In the first step an analysis is undertaken  of the extent of trade faking in Nigeria's
trade using the UN trade Data System.  The focus of attention here is Nigeria's trade with
Industrial Market Economies. In the second step, we analyze using the SITC classification  the
extent of trade faking that exists in the fuel section of Nigeria's export trade. Oil is Nigeria's
most important export. The last step deals with the industrial  countries. It is the result of this
calculation that is reported in the main body of this paper. The other results are reported in
appendices  B-E.  The data from industrial countries  which is adjudged reliable is subsequently
used to arrive at the adjusted capital flight estimates.
Before presenting the results of the calculations, it is necessary not only to discuss the
rationale  behind trade faking, but also analyze the reasons for the existence  of discrepancy in
recorded data on exports and imports.  Most of the studies on trade faking started in the early
1960s and 1970s.  Of note are the studies by Bhagwati  (1964, 1967), Bhagwati, Krueger and
Wibulswasdi  (1974), Simkin  (1970), Richter (1970), Yeats  (1978)  Nayak (1977). Recent studies
since the 1980s include that of McDonald  (1985), De Wulf (1981), and Yeats (1981, 1990),
Boyce (1990), and Gulati (1987).
It is true that the imports of anyone country is the exports of another country.  Thus, it is
expected that the ratio of the values of imports  of a country (say country A) that originate from
another country (say country B) over the values of exports from country B to country A which
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statistics (i.e. exports and imports) may not match.  One of the reasons is the under-invoicing
or over-invoicing  of trade transactions  as a means of effecting capital flight.
The differential in the export-import  statistics  may, however.,  not be due to illicit or illegal
activities connected with under-invoicing  or over invoicing of  trade statistics.  There are a
number of  other factors that may be responsible for the data discrepancy.  These include
shipping costs, diversions enroute to final destination, re-export of goods, differential  lags in
reporting, potential  discrepancies  arising from the conversion  from one currency to another and
then to a common currency usually the US dollar and  variations in exchange rate (De Wulf,
1981; and Yeats,  1990).  Perhaps one of  the basic causes of trade data discrepancy in Sub-
Saharan African countries is due to the routing process for trade transactions.  This problem
occurs when goods are routed through several countries  bordering  the exporter and/or importer
country before the final destination is reached. Thus, in these cases "the country of origin may
inaccurately  list a routing  country as the importer, or the country  of final destination  may report
the routing  country as the exporter. A range of discrepancies  may thus appear between  the three
(or more) parties for the transactions".(Yeats,  1990, p.  137).
Countries that maintain  overvalued  currencies  and restrict access to foreign currencies are
often the setting for invoice alterations. One of the basic reasons for trade faking in developing
countries  is the fact that exchange  controls are common  place. Consequently  foreign currencies
can be brought or sold at a premium in the black market for foreign exchange. As a result of
the premium  on foreign  exchange, the tendency  exists to under-invoice  exports and over-invoice
imports.  That of course is not the only reason.  The existence  of high import duties can also
provide the incentives  among importers to under-invoice  imports in contrast to the usual case
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If there is a  subsidy on imports it will likely cause over-invoicing  of imports.  A tariff on
exports will lead to under-invoicing  while over-invoicing  of exports exists when a subsidy  exists
on exports.
Under-invoicing  of imports can systematically  arise in the following  two cases. The first
case is one where the imported commodity  carries a tariff duty.  The second  situation is one
in which the importation  of the commodity  is strictly controlled.  In the case of the tariff duty,
it pays the importer to understate  the value of his imports when the amount of savings he will
make in tariff duties exceeds the extra price that he must pay to procure foreign  exchange  in the
black market.  Thus, th. importer benefits by under-invoicing  if:
T-Bp  > O
where T=  tariff rate, and Bp is black market foreign exchange rate at premium.(Bhagwati,
1964).
In the case of quantitative  import restrictions, under-invoicing  is profitable  if two conditions  are
met. The first is that under-invoicing  enables  a larger quantity to be imported under  license and
secondly the premium on the imported commodity in the domestic market is greater than the
foreign exchange premium.
Over the last several years, there has been a thriving black market in foreign exchange in
Nigeria.  In  addition, the  tariff policy has consistently varied allowing at  one time  the
importation  of certain commodities at either zero or positive rate to a situation of total ban at
another time.  Also during the 1979-84  civilian administration,  the issuing of import licenses to
businessmen  was in vogue.  The existence of these situations inevitably provided the fertile
ground  for the over-invoicing  and/or over-invoicing  of exports and imports.
CARfAL ft*NTOMM  NIA  *.1. ajay  peg  44One of the mechanisms  for preventing  customs  abuse is preshipment  inspection(PSI).  PSI
verifies the quantity, quality, and price of imports before shipment  from the exporting  country.
As a complement  to its foreign  exchange  control, Nigeria implemented  a PSI  program in January
1979.This  was carried out by  Societe Generale  de Surveillance  (SGS).  On October 1, 1984, the
previous contract with SGS was ended and three other companies were hired.These were
Intertek(goods from North and South America; Bureau Veritas (for goods from Continental
Europe and Africa; and Cotecna(for  goods from the United  Kingdom, Asia and South Pacific).
Quite  a  large  array  of  products  apart  from  the  imposition  of  value  limitations
are,however,exempted  from the PSI program. Thus, the program has not been successful  in
eliminating trade faking as would be shown later.
The usual method for the purpose of investigating  the existence as well as estimating the
extent of faking of intemational trade transactions  is partner country data comparisons. Using
this analysis, the results of the calculations  for the period 1970-89  are as reported in tables 13
to 15. The methodologies  adopted follow the analysis by Nayak (1977)  for under/over-invoicing
and Boyce (1990) for estimating  discrepancies. The result shown in table 13 shows the extent
of trade faking to industrialised  countries. For the period 1970-89, there was under-invoicing
of exports and over-invoicing  of imports. From the calculation  in table 14, there was a general
under-invoicing  of exports to the cumulative  total of US$ 8.2 billion over the period 1970-89.
On the other hand, the imports were over-invoiced in general to the tune of about US $6.0
billion for the entire period. Nigeria's reported cumulative export trade to the industrialised
world was US$83.7 billion in 1970-80  and US$86.3billion  in  1981-90.
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adjustment. The misinvoicing  adjustment us derived from the export-import discrepancy.The
misinvoicing  adjustments  are then used to arrive at the adjusted  capital flight shown in Table 16.
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EXTENT OF TRADE FAKING TO INDUSTRIALIZED COJNTRIES 1972 - 1989
IMPO  :.T  EXPORT
YEAR  FAKING %  FAKING  l
1970  7.49  8.59
1971  12.06  7.32
1972  7.14  6.30
1973  7.86  10.15
1974  2.38  -4.65
1975  7.79  -6.91
1976  20.02  -6.87
1977  12.41  -9.55
1978  0.00  0.01
1979  13.76  -4.77
1980  0.01  0.00
1981  12.78  -13.96
1982  12.65  -13.39
1983  0.01  0.01
1984  -0.01  0.00
1985  0.01  0.00
1986  -9.09  -13.14
1987  -9.09  0.16
1988  -9.21  0.33
1989  -9.09  -0.37
CUMULATED
TOTALS:
1970-89  79.88  -40.74
1972-89  60.33  -56.65
1979-84  39.20  -32.11
1980-89  -11.03  -40.36
Notes:  Plus is over-invoicing; minus is under-invoicing.
Source: Calculated  from IMF:  Direction of Trade Statistics.
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TRADE FAKING  - ANALYSIS  OF EXPORTS  AND IMPORTS!
(INUSTRIAL  COUNTRIES  ANALYSISl
(US$ MILLION)
EXPORT  IMPORT
YEAR  DISCREPANCY*  DISCREPANCY*
1970  -90.45  -61.4
1971  -116.33  -137.3
1972  -125.50  -85.8
1973  -296.00  -116.4
1974  415.50  -54.4
1975  536.30  -377.1
1976  652.40  -1187.7
1977  1040.00  -1042.8
1978  -1.30  0.1
1979  803.00  -1043.6
1980  0.10  -1.1
1981  2405.20  -1947.3
1982  1962.10  -1403.2
1983  -0.60  -0.5
1984  0.30  0.3
1985  0.60  -0.6
1986  1019.30  358.9
1987  -12.30  392.4
1988  -23.60  386.8
1989  37.60  366.1
CUMULATED
TOTAL
1970-89  -8206.32  5954.6
Notes: *See notes under Table 15.
Source:  Calculated  from IMF:  Direction of Trade Statistics.
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TRADE FAKING  OR TRADE INVOICING DISCREPANCIES
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES  ANALYSIS  (1970-1989)
(US$MIl,LIONS)
EXPORT  IMPORT  MIS-INVOICING
YEAR  DISCREPANCY  DISCREPANCY  ADJUSTMENT
1970  -90.45  -61.40  -29.05
1971  -116.33  -137.30  20.97
1972  -125.50  -85.80  -39.70
1973  -296.00  -116.40  -179.60
1974  415.50  -54.40  469.90
1975  536.30  -377.10  913.40
1976  652.40  -1187.70  1840.10
1977  1040.00  -1042.80  2082.80
1978  .1.30  0.10  -1.40
1979  803.00  -1043.60  1846.60
1980  0.10  -1.10  1.20
1981  2405.20  -1947.30  4352.50
1982  1962.10  -1403.20  3365.30
1983  -0.60  -0.50  -0.10
1984  0.30  0.30  0.00
1985  0.60  -0.06  1.20
1986  1019.30  358.90  660.40
1987  -12.30  392.40  -404.70
1988  -23.60  386.80  -410.40
1989  37.60  366.10  -328.50
TOTAL  -8206.32  5954.60  14160.92
Notes:
1.  Export Discrepancy=Mtp-(XNGA*cif/fob  factor)
2.  Import Discrepancy  =(Xtp*cif/fob  factor)-MNGA
3.  Misinvoicing  Adjustment= Export Discrepancy  -import discrepancy.
4.  Mtp, Xtp refer to trading partner imports and exports respectively;  MNGA and XNGA
refer to Nigeria's reported imports and exports respectively.
Source:  Calculated  from IMF, Direction  of Trade Statistics  and IMF:  IFS Statistics Yearbook
1990.
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NIGERIA:  ADIUSIED CAPITAL  FLIGHT ESTIMATES 1972-1989*
IN US$ MILLIONS
DERIVED
ESTIMATED  TOTAL  RESIDUAL  HOT  HOT  METHOD*
YEAR  K.  FLIGHT  OUTFLOWS  METHOD  METHOD  I  METHOD  II  SOUR & USE
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
1972  206.45  733.40  79.30  79.30  626.00
1973  -556.90  -551.46  472.96  -356.60  -418.12  876.40
1974  -8634.20  294.C4  -9139.17  517.90  494.64  797.30
1975  10021.40  403.62  1161.21  871.40  826.90  1367.30
1976  3113.00  1115.73  2705.56  1845.10  1857.88  1919.70
1977  4699.60  1664.20  6739.67  1851.80  1725.43  4951.00
1978  3313.40  3058.00  8240.22  41.60  195.25  3803.90
1979  -6476.60  3986.69  -2025.78  2057.60  2066.82  4854.60
1980  -573.20  594.62  -7838.29  -671.80  -662.87  1182.20
1981  22836.40  6046.10  20479.50  4458.50  4499.25  9598.50
1982  -2936.00  8681.48  14297.19  3514.30  6519.81  9790.60
1983  3213.50  3581.11  10908.50  -63.10  1045.80  9842.30
1984  3339.30  -'100.61  -406.61  -642.00  -535.14  565.60
1985  -2069.30  -3663.81  -1248.11  -2012.80  175.11  -583.90
1986  9191.20  -674.00  5567.81  411.40  1856.39  4475.30
1987  5167.50  -5813.59  5995.55  -1357.70  -2193.16  9226.40
1988  -457.80  -5351.40  1363.60  -1725.40  1478.60  1258.70
1989  -2842.00  1052.50  13675.50  -2223.50  195.50  3858.10
CUMULATIVE:
1973-80  4906.50  10771.89  1049.78  6236.30  6165.23  20378.40
1979-83  16064.10  22890.00  35821.12  9295.50  13468.81  35268.20
1983-87  18842.20  -8670.90  20826.14  -3664.20  349.00  23525.70
1972-89  40349.30  12529.67  71691.71  6596.00  19207.39  68410.00
1980-89  34869.60  2352.40  62803.64  -312.10  12379.29  49213.80
1972-79  5479.79  10177.27  8888.07  6908.10  6828.10  19196.20
1979-84  19403.40  20789.39  35414.51  8653.50  12933.67  35833.80
1985-89  8989.60  25363.35  -6908.08  1512.44  18123.60
Notes:  *Adjusted Estimates is Table  12 plus misinvoicing adjustments.
Sources:
(1)  As in Table 12
(2)  IMF Direction  of Trade Statistics  Yearbxx)k
(3)  IMF:  IFS Statistics Yearbook  1990.
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CAUSES OF CAPITAL FLIGHT
The causes of capital flight as discussed  in the literature are many.  These various causes can be groupec
under relative risks, exchange  rate misalignment,  financial  sector constraints  and/or  repression, fiscal deficits
and external incentives  (Khan, 1989)  and disbtirsement  of new loans to LDCs (Cuddington, 1987). These are
no doubt economic causes of capital flight. There are,  however, other non-economic  causes which though
important are often ignored.  These include the corription of political leaders and extraordinary access to
government  funds.  These factors are now discussed.
In decision making process, the wealth holder looks at the various risks confronting him.  There are
certain inherent characteristics  of developir:g  countries which make risks attached to investments  larger than
those  of developed  countries. Using the concept  of expropriation  risk into an intertemporal  optimizing  model
Khan and Haque  (1985) show that any increase in risk in a rational  expectations  setting would tend to increae
the  outflow of private capital from the domestic economy into foreign countries where investments  are less
risky. This expropriation  risk could include a variety of distortions  such as differences  in taxes and political
instability  resulting in possible reduction in private property.  Eaton (1987) builds on the Khan-Haque  model
by relating the risk of expropriation  of capital owned domestically  which is defined especially  in this case as
higher taxation to public and public.y-guaranweed  foreign debt.  The tax obligation  arising from increase in
external  debt can lead to capital flight. The flight of one investor  leads to a rise in the potential  tax obligation
of the remaining investors in the domestic  economy. This also may create the incentive  for other investors to
move abroad, too.
It is generally  agreed that one of the principal  determinants  of capital flight is exchange  rate  misalignment
The importance  of this variable  has amply been  demonstrated  in several empirical  analyses  including  the studies
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exchange rate plays a significant role in the direction and magnitude  of capital flight from highly-indebted
developing  countries.  Under normal circumstances,  if a currency appreciation  is expected, domestic wealth
owners would shift out of domestic assets into foreign  assets.  In general, it is difficult to measure precisely
exchange rate expectations. It is safe, however, to assume that if a currency is overvalued,  economic  agents
would  expect the currency to be devalued  in the futuire. Holding  firm to this expectation  would  cause residents
to avoid the potential capital loss by converting into foreign  claims.
Financial  sector constraints  can lead to capital flight. It is well known that narrowness  of the capital  and
money markets is a  feature of developing economies. Financial markets in these countries provide only a
limited variety of financial instniments in which wealth can be held.  There is also in  many developing
countries  the lack of full or credible deposit insurance  on assets that are held in the domestic banking  secto.
This deficiency is, however,being  increasingly  remedied  by many developing  countries.
Additionally,  there are extensive  controls on interest rates and other aspects  of financial  market behavior
in developing  countries.  Government  policies  in the financial  sector have resulted in normal interest rates that
are far below the rates on comparable  foreign financial  instruments. In most cases,the real rates of return on
domestic financial assets are negative.  Given the variotis forms of financial repression it is expected that
investors  in these countries  will seek for alternative  countries  where their assets that will yield not only positive
but higher returns.  Holding  assets in foreign financial  instruments  provide the sought-after  alternative.
It has been shown by Dornbusch (1985) that capital flight is typically accompanied  by fiscal deficits.
When a rising fiscal deficit is financed through the printing of money, it leads to inflationary  pressures.  In
order to avoid the erosion of their monetary  balances by inflation, moving  out of domestic  assets is one way
by which wealth owners avoid inflation tax. When fiscal deficit is financed through bond sales, domestic
residents may expect that at some future date their tax liabilities  may increase in order to pay for the national
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potential tax liabilities. Ize and Ortiz (1986) formalized the link between deficit financing  and capital flight.
In the Ize-Ortiz model, capital flight is related to the overall financial  solvency  of government. Insolvency  and
default risk created by fiscal deficit appear explicitly  as the determinants  of capital flight.
A number of external factors influence  the flight of capital.  These external influences  in general are in
the form of opportunities available outside the country.  These include the attractiveness  of foreign interest
rates, the wide array of financial instruments  in which wealth can be held,political and economic stability,
favorable  tax climate etc. These sets of incentives  is aptly described  by Walter (1987, p. 120). "Flight  implies
havens, and havens take the form of national  status that provide an attractive  range of real and financial  assets
to foreign  based investors, political  and economic  stability,  a favorable  tax climate for non-residents  and various
other attributes  that generally  are the obverse  of conditions  triggering  capital  flight in the first place."  On so.
types of deposits, withholding taxes are not taken from non-resident  deposits.  In certain countries,secret
accounts are allowed. While the secrecy of accounts is attractive to some wealth owners for the purpose of
maintaining  the privacy of their accounts,but it also inadvertently  favors illegal transactions  and tax evasion,
both of which benefit from the secrecy.
As a result of the principle of national sovereignty, it is difficult for a foreign country's government to
have inside information  on the foreign bank asset holdings  of its individual  citizens abroad.  One safeguard is
the domestic bank secrecy law which bars both the national and foreign authorities alike.  The other is the
blocking  statute which  effectively  prevents the disclosure,  copying, inspection  or removal  of documents  located
in the host country in compliance  with order from or by foreign authorities  (see el Hadj, 1979);  Newcomb  and
Kohler, 1983).
Some  economists  and policy  analysts  argue that capital  inflows in the form of disbursements  to developing
countries  are a major cause of capital flight. In the case of public sector borrowing, the availability  of foreign
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assert that for many developing countries, (Nigeria perhaps inclusive), abuse of official power through the
misuse of such funds can lead to capital flight.  Highly-placed  public officials using the paraphernalia  of their
office can siphon some of the money under their care  to foreign countries solely for the private use of
themselves  and their immediate  family. Whether  disbursements  and capital flight are however correlated is an
empirical  question.
While all the facts discussed  so far are important  in the Nigerian  case, it is difficult to rank the various
causes of capital flight in any order of importance.  It is known, however, that poor macroeconomic  policy
stance have resulted in all kinds of distortions.  The role played by other factors such as access to foreign
exchange through various perquisites of offices and possible  abuse thereof,though  difficult to measure cannot,
however,be underestimated.  These other factors, too,no doubt have their origin in the economic situation  of
the country.
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ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
The causes  of capital flight have been discussed in an earlier chapter.  Several of the models explaining
capital flight include Cuddington  (1986, 1987)  Dooley (1988), Dornbusch  (1985), Boyce (1990) Pastor (1989
1990) and Mikkelson  (1991).
The variables that are expected to affect capital flight are as follows:
(i) The level of the country's foreign exchange reserves:
Higher reserves are perceived as indicator of a lower likelihood  for a balance of payments crisis(Boyce,
1990). Higher foreign exchange reserves are expected to lead to less capital flight.
,ii) The degree of appreciation  or depreciation  of the exchange  rate: the higher the degree of appreciati^
or depreciation  of the exchange rate in the domestic economy  the higher the extent of capital flight.
(iii) The rate of growth of the economy  as measured  by the GNP:  The higher the level of growth in the
economy  and hence the opportunities  for investment, the less the extent of capital flight.
(iv) Difference  between the international  and domestic  real interest rate:  The larger the differential, th
more is capital flight induced.
(v) Changes in inflation rate is expected to have a positive effect on capital flight.
(vi) Financial repression: The greater the extent of financial  repression in the economy, the greater the
resultant capital flight.
(vii) Government  Surplus or deficit/GNP : This ratio is a signal of the possibility  or likelihood  of a fiscal
crisis. Following  Anthony  and Hallett  (1990) argument,if  fiscal deficit is large, it can be viewed  as an indicator
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avoid  it by reducing  their  domestic  asset  holdings  and  build up instead  their foreign  asset  holdings.  Even  if no
repression  actually  takes  place  in the  form described  that is the  deficit is not bond  or tax financed,  a large
deficit implies  inflation  and  currency  depreciation.  Thus  in any  of these  cases,as  the  ratio  becomes  negatively
larger,capital  flight takes  place.One  would  therefore  expect  a higher  surplus  (or lower  deficit)  to result  in less
capital  flight.
(viii) Disbursements  from  loan:  It is generally  believed  that  as  more  loans  are  disbursed  to some  countries
the  basis  for "debt  driven"  and  debt-fuelled"  capital  flight is created.lt  is therefore  expected  that  the  higher  the
disbursement,  the  more  the  extent  of capital  flight.
The  general  model  is of the following  form  (with the  expected  signs).
- +  +  +  +  +  +  - +
KFi  =  (GGNP, RF*, RRDIF, CINF, MER, FER, DISBU, FG, FIR)  (4)
where  KFi stands  for the  different  versions  of capital  flight estimates.  The  definitions  of the  variables  are  in
appendix  H.  As shown  earlier,  we have  defined  and  computed  capital  flight using  different  methodologies.
Since  we do  not intend  to apply  the  econometric  model  to the  various  estimates  of capital  flight, it is necessary
to show  ,however,the  extent  to which  the  various  estimates  demonstrate  some  degree  of commonality  and  are
therefore  measuring  capital  flight.  The  result  of the  correlation  matrix  for the  different  methods  is shown  in
appendix  I.  We are  in general  satisfied  that  most  of the  estimates  for the  adjusted  capital  estimates  show  not
only positive  but  high  correlation.  This is particularly  true  of KFF, KFD; KFB, KFE; KFC, KEF, KFD, KFE
where  the  correlation  coefficient  is greater  than  80 percent.
The results  of the estimations  of the model  are shown  in table 17.  The estimation  technique  is the
ordinary  least  square  (OLS). The  t-values  of the  coefricients  are  in parenthesis  below  the  relevant  variables.We
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given the available  evidence for other countries in the literature that the equations have performed very well.
From the results also, there is in general robustness  in the sense that the coefficients of tte  variables used
remain unchanged (no reversal of signs) over different specifications  utilized.  Some other results are shown
in the appendix (Appendix  J).
The general results from the equations are that capital flight in Nigeria is sensitive to real interest rate
differential, growth of the domestic economy, degree of appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate,
foreign  interest rate with the augmentation  of the rate of depreciation/appreciation  of the exchange  rate and the
fiscal deficit of government. The degree of significance  of these variables do of course differ.  There is no
evidence  to support the hypothesis  that disbursement  of loans (disbursement  of external  debt) influences  capital
flight in any form. Thus, we donot find evidence of the "debt driven"or "debt fuelled" capital flight arisia.,
from this variable.
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RESULTS  OF REGRESSION  ANALYSIS
KFA  KFA  KFA  KVA  KFA  KFA*'  KFA*|  KFA  |  KFA"O  KFA*  |
CONSTANT  -.120  -.042  .009  .019  -.004  -.105  -.049  -.0004  .005  -.015
(-2.13)0  (-I.33)+  (.37)  (.52)  (-.12)  (-1.99)0  (-1.71)+  (.0.02)  (0.16)  (-0.S4)
GONP  -.003  -.002  -.002  003  -.003  -.003  -.002  -.002  -.003  -.003
(-3.61)*  (-3.24)  (-2.67)'  (-3.00)*  (-2.96)*  (-3..5)*  (-3.65)*  (-3.14)*  (-3.22)'  _-3.11)*
RF_  .0A  .002
(1.52)+  _  (1.39)+
RRDIF  .005  .005  .004  .004  .005  .004  .004  .004
(2.98)*  (2.61)*  (2.32)'  (2.25)0  (2.98)'  (2.81)*  (2.S)*  (2.43)*
CINF  .003  .003
(I.XI)+  (2.28)*
FiR  .064  .049
(2.13)*  (1.74)+
MER  .002  .002
(1.57)+  (I.S3)+
FSGNP  -.566  -.614  -.503  -.559
(1.95)'  (I.86)+  (-1.92)+ (-1.93)+
R:  0.56  0.54  0.45  0.50  0.49  0.56  0.5X  0.53  0.55  0.53
Adj.R 2 0.46  0.44  0.32  0.39  0.39  0.47  0.49  0.42  0.45  0.43
D.W.  2.03  2.19  2.27  1.69  1.68  2.23  2.29  2.37  1.92  1.90
Significant  at 5% or better
Significant  at about or better than 10%
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SUMMARY  OF RF-SUIT-S  AND CONCLUSIONS
We have  attempted to address capital flight issues  in this paper. Specifically,  we have tried
to estimate the magnitudes  of capital flight using various estimation techniques. We have also
discussed the  causes,  the  mechanisms/conduits  of  capital flight and  have  undertaken an
econometric  analysis of the determinants  of capital flight.  In addition, we have also estimated
the total stock of Nigeria's external claims. One of the novelties  of this study lies in taking due
cognizance  of international  trade faking in arriving at the adjusted capital flight estimates.
A number of conclusions  can be drawn from the present study.  The first is that there is
no generally accepted  definition  of capital flight hence the use of several concepts  in this paper.
What the paper has done in essence is to provide the "bands" or 'range'  for capital flight in
Nigeria. Second, a significant  proportion  of capital flight can be estimated from recorded data
in the balance of payments  and debt statistics.  The implication of that, however, is that the
reliability  of the measures  is dependent  on the accuracy  of the items in the balance  of payments
statistics, and debt data.  Significant  amounts  of capital flight relative to extemal debt took place
over the years covered in this study. Trade faking has been discovered  as an important  vehicle
of effecting  capital flight. A significant  amount of under-invoicing  of exports and over-invoicing
of imports took place in the periods tinder study. In the period 197089, exports were under-
invoiced to the tune of about US$8.2 billion while the over-invoicing  of imports was about
US$5.96.  A detailed analysis of the fuel SITC was also undertaken  to discover the amount of
trade  faking in the oil sector,Nigeria's most important  export.  There was substantial  amount
of trade faking in the period covered.
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flight, some  degree of commonality  have  been established  between the various  estimates. Thus,
the different methodologies  used measure capital flight.
Fourth,the ratio of total external claims to the stock of debt which was only 60.4 percent
in 1973 rose to a ratio of over 200 percent in 1976. Although  it declined thereafter, it stood at
over 80 percent in 1989.
The econometric  analysis  did demonstrate  clearly  that domestic  macroeconomic  policy  error
is the culprit in  the capital flight episode. Of significance in  the area of policy errors are
inflation,exchange  rate misalignment(appreciation  or depreciation of the exchange rate),fiscal
deficit and lack of opportunities  for profitable  investment within the domestic economy.  The
attractions  offered by the foreign sector cannot be left out of the analysis.  The foreign attraction
as shown,for  example,in  the relative rates of return was found to be significant.  The elimination
of distortions within the economy  can minimize  substantially  externally held foreign claims and
minimize  capital flight which can serve useftil  purposes in the domestic economy.
The policy issues that can be drawn from the analyses  are very clear: there is need for the
maintenance  of sound  domestic  macroeconomic  policy. The various  aspects  are hereby  discussed.
In order  to control capital flight,there is need to ensure that the nation's currency is not
overvalued. This can be done by setting it at a realistic level or by allowing the currency to
float.
There is a lot to be said for the free flow of capital as this would  prevent the need to use trade
faking for the illicit acquisition  of foreign  exchange. In addition  an integrated  and unified  tariff
structure would be useful as it will reduce the rewards for trade faking. Thus a viable trade
policy is essential for preventing  illicit activities.
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inflation.It would therefore be necessary to ensure that there is fiscal discipline  so that deficits
as  a  proportion of  the gross domestic product is kept in check as  this is crucial to  the
maintenance of  macroeconomic stability. Economic growth provides the opportunities for
possible profitable investments  and will therefore help to reduce if not totally eliminate  capital
flight. As investment  opportunities  are enhanced and profitability  ensured within the domestic
economy, the retention of domestic money would be less difficult.
There is need to enstire  a positive real rate of interest.  The rate should be high enough to attract
funds but not too high to stifle investment initiatives.
The prescription mentioned  above are being addressed within the package of the structural
adjustment  program which  the country  embarked  upon in 1986. The center-piece  of that  package
is the adoption of a realistic exchange rate determined  by market forces.If the policy package
discussed  are pursued rightly  and with consistency,it  should  be possible  to minimize  if not totally
eliminate  capital flight.
The issue of the existence  of and hiow  to deal with corruption is certainly more difficult
to prescribe. It is nevertheless  part of the general problem of capital flight.One can only safely
say that there is need for attitLldinal  changes on the part of those who hold public offices and
have access to foreign  funds directly or through  the contracts which they award. This attitudinal
changes involve  a serious  commitment  to honest  government.  The importance  of honesty  cannot
be overemphasized.  It is true to assert that "a society  that lacks the social cohesion  to ensure that
its leaders place public duties ahead of personal gain may well be condemned  to repeated bouts
of capital flight." (Williamson  and Lessard,  1987 p.34)
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adoption of appropriate macroeconomic  stance or the adoption of appropriate macroeconomic
policy stance to forestall capital outflow poses more challenges to the economy than is often
realised.  Part  of  the  challenge arises  from  the  fact  that  the  adoption of  appropriate
macroeconomic  policy  stance is not a one-shot  affair. Indeed  the economy  may have  to run faster
each time in order to (at least) remain standing still! There is need not only for consistency  in
the pursuit of appropriate policy, but adaptation  to suit varying  circumstances  of the economy.
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This appendix  explains  table  4,
Column  I  Record  Claims  on Non-Resident  Other  than  Direct  Investment
Balance  of Payments  Statistics  Yearbook  (BOPY)  lines  62-64,  69-71, 77-79,  84, 85, 89,
93, 94, 98-109.
Column  2 Net Errors  and  Omissions.
BOPY  lines 112.
Coluimin  3 TotIQ  External  Claims  Balance  of Payments
Sum  of columns  I and  2.
Column  4 Unrecorded  Stock  of External  Claims
Total  external  Debt  recorded  in the  World Bank  Debt  Tables  minus  Debt  recorded  in the
Balance  of Payments  Statistics.  The  balance  of payments  debt  statistics  are line 53-61,  65-68,
72-76,  80-83,  86-88,  90-92,  95-97, 1  10, 111.
Column  5 Total Stock  of External  Claims
Is the  sums  of columns  3 and  4.
The difference  between  Dooley  (1988)  and  the  approach  above  is that  the  estimated  value  of
the  non-direct  investment  income  at the  end  of the  first year  is not  added.
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EXTENT OF TRADE  FAKING IN EXPORTS*
YEAR  DISCREPANCY  DEGREE  OF FAKING %
1970  111213  11
1971  133613  9
1972  128676  7
1973  308795  12
1974  266561  3
1975  -299216  -4
1976  -115450  -1
1977  -599936  -6
1978  -143296  -2
1979  -869747  -6
1980  1565464  7
1981  -1925304  -12
19R2  741978  6
1983  -1115895  -11
1984  -381190  -4
1985  -352569  -3
1986  -1719321  -25
CUMULATIVE
1970-86  -4265626  -18
1970-76  534191  37
1980-86  -3186838  -42
1973-80  113174  3
Notes: *Exports adjusted by the cif/cof factor.
*Analysis  from U.N. Trade System Indtistrial  Market Economies.
Source:  Calculated  from the UN Data System.
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EXTENT  OF TRADE FAKING  IN IMPOB_T*
000's US$
YEAR  DISCREPANCY  DEGREE  OF FAKING  %
1970  75589  9
1971  149524  13
1972  94019  8
1973  131092  9
1974  82077  4
1975  337650  7
1976  1211023  20
1977  1069783  12
1978  1633878  17
1979  1078847  14
1980  -2936088  -22
1981  1968822  13
1982  -1618646  -15
1983  414071  6
1984  -187707  -4
1985  -270531  -5
1986  -913723  -22
CUMULATIVE
1970-86  2319681  64
1970-76  2080974  69
1980-86  -3543800  -48
1973-80  2608262  61
Notes: *Analysis  from U.N. Trade  System Industrial  Market Economies.
Source: As  in Appendix  B.
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EXTENT OF TRADE FAKING IN EXPORTS FUEL SITC 1970-1986
000's US$
IMPORTS  ADJUSTED
NIGERIA'S  OF  IMPORTS  DEGREE
REPORTED  INDUSTRY  INDUSTRY  OF
YEAR  EXPORTS  COUNTRIES  COUNTRIES  DISCREPANCY  FAKING %
tl)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
1970  630087  654338  594853  35234  6
1971  1215870  1232905  1120823  95047  8
1972  1646603  1708679  1553345  93258  6
1973  2460018  2371901  215674  303744  14
1974  7745884  8235317  7486652  259232  3
1975  6190128  7199685  6545168  -355040  -5
1976  7707877  8666249  7878408  -170531  -2
1977  8184198  9758153  8871048  -686850  -8
1978  7755509  8839819  8036199  -280690  -3
1979  13491554  15796866  14360787  -869233  -6
1980  22467453  23014454  20922231  1545222  -7
1981  13138458  16612081  15101892  -1963434  -13
1982  13686168  14250077  12954615  731553  6
1983  8889376  11049305  10044823  -1155447  -12
1984  9707467  11180629  10164208  -456741  -4
1985  10638854  12108858  11008053  -369199  -3
1986  4903536  733383  6667125  -1763589  -26
CUMULATIVE
1970-86  -5007464  -33
1970-76  260945  30
1980-86  -3431635  -6
1973-80  -254146  0
Source: U.N. Data System.
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EXTENT OF TRADE FAKING IN IMPORTS :FUEL SITC 19790-.
000's USS
NIGERIA'S  ADJUSTED
REPORTED  EXPORT OF  EXPORT OF
IMPORTS  M1ARKET  MARKET  DEGREE
FROM  ECONOMIES  ECONOMIES  OF
YEAR  MKT. ECONO.  TO NGA  TO NGA  DISCREPANCY  FANG  %
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5
1970  21972  11642  12806  9166  7
1971  8685  11217  12339  -3654  -3_
1972  10107  8730  9603  504  5
1973  13167  11251  12376  791  6
1974  45665  30040  33044  12621  3R
1975  100246  77347  85082  15164  1
1976  204631  140454  154499  50132  3
1977  125162  162711  178982  -52820  -3-
1978  211663  287236  315960  -104297  -33
1979  193188  711687  782856  -589668  -75
1980  574962  825787  908366  -333404  -37
1981  223601  252556  277812  -54211  -20
1982  258632  295591  325150  -66518  -20
1983  72146  268358  295194  -223048  -76
1984  65624  64700  71170  -5546  -8
1985  51345  35357  38893  12452  32
1986  20784  120268  132295  -111511  -84
CUMULATIVE
1970-86  -1443845  -208
1970-76  84724  142
1980-86  -781785  -212
1973-80  -1001480  -80
Source: As in Appendix  B.
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EXTERNAL DEBT AND  STOCK OF EXTERNAL CLAIMS
_~~~~~~
|  Yi,AR  j  STOEXTCL  EXTDEBT  REXTCDEB
1972  1104.5  732.0  150.9
1973  727.3  1205.0  60.4
1974  8365.0  1274.0  -656.6
1975  790.5  1143.0  69.2
1976  2074.5  906.0  229.0
1977  4675.i  3146.0  148.6
1978  7966.0  5091.0  156.5
1979  -368.5  6235.0  -5.9
1980  -916.8  8934.0  -10.3
1981  17560.5  12018.0  146.1
1982  112'.4.1  12954.0  86.7
1983  14441.6  18539.0  77.9
1984  17775.3  18537.0  95.9
1985  15710.3  19551.0  80.4
1986  24242.3  24043.0  100.8
1987  29810.1  31193.0  95.6
1988  29761.0  31947.0  93.1
1989  27252.0  32832.0  83.0
Notes:  (1) STOEXTCL  =  Total stock of extermal  claims
(2) EXTDEBT = External Debt
(3) REXTCDEB  =  Ratio  of total stock of external claims to level of external
claims to level of external debt in percentaiges.
Sources:  1.  Total stock of external claims from calculations  (See Appendix  A)
2.  External Debt from World Bank  World Debt Tahles several years.
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ADJUSTED  CAPITAL  FLIGHT  ESTIMATES  AS PERCENTAGE  OF EXTERNAL  DEBT  _
ESTIMATED  TOTAL  RESIDUAL  HOT  HOT  DERIVED
YEAR  K. FLIGHT  OUTFLOWS  METHOD  METHOD  I  METHOD  1  METHOD
Al  A2  A3  A4  AS  A6
1972  28.2  100.1  10.8  10.8  85.5
1973  -46.2  -45.8  39.2  -29.6  -34.7  72.7
1974  -677.7  22.8  -717.4  40.7  38.8  62.6
1975  876.8  35.3  101.6  76.2  72.3  119.6
1976  343.6  123.1  298.6  203.7  205.1  211.9
1977  149.4  52.9  214.2  58.9  54.8  157.9
1978  65.1  60.1  161.9  0.8  3.8  74.7
1979  -103.9  63.9  -32.5  33.0  33.1  77.9
1980  -6.4  6.7  -87.7  -7.5  -7.4  13.2
1981  190.0  50.3  170.4  37.1  37.4  79.9
1982  -22.7  67.0  110.4  27.1  50.3  75.6
1983  17.3  19.3  58.8  -0.3  5.6  53.1
1984  18.0  -11.3  -2.2  -3.5  -2.9  3.1
1985  -10.6  -18.7  -6.4  -10.3  0.9  -3.0
1986  38.1  -2.8  23.2  1.7  7.7-  18.6
1987  16.6  -18.6  19.2  -4.4  7.0  29.6
1988  -1.4  -16.8  4.3  -5.4  4.6  3.9
1989  8.7  3.2  41.7  -6.8  0.6  11.8
Notes: *AII  figures rounded to one decimal  place.
Source:  Calculated  from table 16.  Data for External Debt is from World Bank: World Debt Tables.
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Each of the KFis  used is deflated  by the U.S. consumer  price index.
KFA  - Adjusted  estimated  capital  flight  adjusted  for Trade  Fakdng  (Column  1, table 16)
KFA**  =  Unadjusted  Estimated  Capital  Flight. (column  1, table 12)
}  =  Adjusted  Estimated  Capital  Flight  adjusted  for trade misinvoicing  'Hot Mehtod' (column  4,
table 16).
KFD**  =  Unadjusted  Estimated  Capital  Flight "Hot  Method' (column  4, table 12)
CINF  Change  in inflation  defined  as the  difference  between  the log of this year's inflation  rate and the
log of last  year's inflation  rate.
GGNP - Percentage  growth  rate in the GNP.
RF  =  Foreign interest rate augmented  by the rate of appreciation  (devaluation)  of the domestic
currency. This is defined  as r Lib + e.  r Lib = the Libor  rate on US deposits  and e is the
actual  rate of appreciation  (depreciation)  of the domestic  currency.
MER  =  Is the degree  of appreciation  or depreciation  of the exchange  rate measured  by the percentage
change  in the market  rate index.(Line  Alx of IFS).
FIR  Financial  repression.Following  Dooley's  (1988)  approach,  this is defined  as:
[(1 + r Libor)/(I + r)]/[l  + In C-In  (C-1)]
where  r Libor  is the libor rate on US dollar  deposit
r is the domestic  rate of interest  on deposit,
c is the domestic  currency  per dollar.
REDIF =  real interest  rate differential  defined  as:
(r Libor - wi)  - (r dep - Nv)
where r Libor is the Libor rate on U.S. dollar deposit,  r dep is the domestic  rate on deposits,  and x;, Nw
represent  inflation  rates in industrial  countries  and Nigeria  respectively.
FG OR  FSGNP  Is the ratio  of Fiscal  Surplus/deficit  as percentage  of GNP.
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FURThIER REGRESSION RESULTS
KFD'  =  -.0160 -.000IGGNP  +.007FIR  +.OO0IOCINF
(-4.67 )(-1.65')  (3.41  ' )  (I.55 +)
R2 =  0.51
Adj R 3 =  0.40
D.W. =  1.90
KFD'  =  -.0170  -.OO0IGGNP  +.007FIR  +.00009CINF
(3.88  ) (1.70-)  (3.36' )  (.84)
.00009  RRDIF  R- =  0.52
(.54)  Adj R: =  0.37
D.W.  = 2.01
KFD'  =  -.0160  -.OOOIGGNP  +.006FIR  +.OOOIOCINF
(4.73*  ) (1.65 )  (3.04 )  (1.67 )
-.023 FSGNP  R  = 0.56
(-1.097')  Adj R 2 =  0.41
D.W.  =  2.29
KFD"  =  -.0130 -. 000IGGNP  +.006FIR  +.OOOIOCINF
(-2.75 ) (-1.88 )  (2.65')  (1.57+)
+.000I  MER  R2 =  0.55
(0.93)  Adj R' =  0.40
D.W.  =  2.03
KFD  =  -.0302  -.0003GGNP  +.022FIR  +.00040RRDIF
(2.05*  ) (-1.40')  (2.75-)  (.87)
R'  =  0.37
Adj R2 =  0.24
D.W. =2.03
KFD  =  -.0230 -.0002GGNP  +.019FIR  -.04600FSGNP
(-1.87+) (1.17+)  (2.33  )  (-.58)
R: =  0.35
Adj  R2  =  0.21
D.W.  - 2.09
KFD  =  -.0230 -.0002GGNP  +.020FIR
(-1.91 ) (1.22')  (2.64 )
R  =  0.33
Adj R  =  0.25
D.W. =  1.87
* significant  at 5%  or better
+  significant  at about  10%
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1.  Some of the studies that include some data on Nigeria include Chang and Cumby (1991), Morgan Trusty (1986,
1988),  Anthony  and  Hallett  (1990).
2.  The differences  between my methodology  and Dooley are explained in the table and the appendix.
3.  The analysis  follow Pastor  (1990, 1991). The Symbols  are different from Pastor's.
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